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LOOK WHAT’S BACK! INSTITUTIONAL COMPLEXITY, REVERSIBILITY 
AND THE KNOTTING OF LOGICS   
 
ABSTRACT 
 
 
Through a comparative historical study of community pharmacy in the UK, Italy, Sweden and 
the USA, we examine what happens to institutional arrangements designed to resolve ongoing 
conflicts between institutional logics over extended periods of time. We find that institutional 
arrangements can reflect the heterogeneity of multiple logics without resulting in hybridization 
or dominance. Because logics remain active, similar conflicts can reappear multiple times. We 
find that the durability of the configurations of competing logics reflects the characteristics of the 
polities in which fields are embedded. The dominance of any societal institutional order leads to 
more stable field level arrangements. We suggest that the metaphor of institutional knots and the 
related image of institutional knotting are useful to capture aspects of this dynamic and to 
foreground the discursive and material work which allows multiple logics to co-exist in local 
arrangements with variable durability. 
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“Professionalism is destroyed when unqualified laymen, driven solely by the 
profit motive, acquire the ownership and the control of professional enterprise. 
The demands of the owner may be expected to clash with the conscience of the 
professional” (Petition by Pharmaceutical Society of Great Britain, 1878). 
 
“Pharmacists are free professionals and such they must remain. It is our duty to 
defend this occupation in order to avoid the pharmacy transforming into a 
drugstore! [Any new regulation should avoid pharmacy] becoming a dishonorable 
trade” (Member of Italian Parliament, 1965). 
 
 
These two quotes are excerpted from legislative discussions in Britain and Italy regarding 
the ongoing societal concern about whether pharmacists should hold the exclusive right to own a 
pharmacy, or not. Both quotes show similar arguments in defense of the right of exclusivity and 
self-control of the pharmacist profession. Yet the claims were raised in two different countries, in 
different situations (court debate vs. parliament debate), almost 90 years apart, and with 
completely different outcomes. The British court ruling allowed for the separation of ownership 
and profession, paving the way for pharmacy multiples (known as chain stores in North 
America). Conversely, the Italian law prevented ownership by anyone except a pharmacist and 
strictly disallowed the existence of chains, presenting them as dishonorable (see Law 475/1968 
and related parliamentary debates). Different institutional logics, i.e. sets of assumptions, values 
and beliefs connected to meaningful practices and material processes (Thornton et al., 2012) 
were clearly at play in these two events: they clashed, and their conflict came to be pacified in 
distinct ways. 
Even though legislation was implemented in both Britain and Italy to resolve 
disagreements about pharmacy control and ownership, the same issues resurfaced and were 
repeatedly addressed. In Britain, the same argument for professionalism re-emerged in a 1968 
court case with the Pharmaceutical Society trying unsuccessfully to curb the diversification of 
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chains’ retail operations. In Italy, the same argument for professionalism was defeated in 1888 in 
parliament by advocates of a free market economy, to be resurrected twenty years later in 
regulations that re-transformed the pharmacy into a public-professional compromise. Similarly, 
in Sweden clashes over pharmacy ownership and control were addressed and resolved multiple 
times. In contrast, in the USA the issue was settled at the beginning of the XX century, rarely to 
surface again. 
How can we explain these events from an institutional logics perspective? Established 
theory suggests that institutional logics coexist and compete within a field (e.g., Greenwood et 
al., 2011), but there has been little attention to how conflicts among the competing logics are 
resolved. We know that “uneasy truces” among logics can exist (Reay and Hinings, 2009) and 
that oscillations in the relative importance of logics can occur (Dunn and Jones, 2010). However, 
little or no research exists which investigates why or how the same conflicts between logics erupt 
over and over again in a field, as was evident in our study. We address this theoretical gap 
concerning the durability of institutional arrangements by employing a comparative case study of 
community pharmacy in the UK, Italy, Sweden and the USA. We explicate how pharmacy was 
structured according to conflicting logics, and how the same conflicts continued to emerge, 
despite arrangements in place to resolve them. We find that although the tensions among 
conflicting logics can be temporarily resolved within specific arrangements that allow for 
institutional compromise, this does not lead to hybridization, dilution or take over as Glynn and 
Lounsbury (2005) and Thornton (2004) found. In mature fields like community pharmacy, 
institutional logics can remain distinct for extended periods of time. We introduce the metaphor 
of institutional knots to identify temporary forms of institutional compromise in which logics are 
woven together while remaining clearly identifiable.  Exploiting the heuristic power of the 
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metaphor of knot, we also investigate why certain arrangements are more durable than others. In 
contrast to previous studies, we conclude that such durability is the result both of local dynamics 
and the characteristics of national level arrangements and their anchoring to global institutional 
streams. 
 
INSTITUTIONAL LOGICS 
The concept of institutional logics has been used to account for how the conduct of social 
actors reflects broader belief systems. Institutional logics are described as ‘ways of ordering 
reality’ (Friedland and Alford, 1991: 243) and ‘the socially constructed, historical patterns of 
material practices, assumptions, values, beliefs, and rules by which individuals produce and 
reproduce their material subsistence, organize time and space, and provide meaning to their 
social reality’ (Thornton and Ocasio, 2008: 804). Institutional logics shape and constrain  
conduct by specifying which goals or values should be pursued within a given domain, and what 
actions, interactions, or interpretations are appropriate for the pursuit (Thornton, et al., 2012). 
 Early work tended to frame the relationship between conflicting logics in terms of 
domination and succession where conflicting logics co-exist only until the winning dominant 
logic becomes prevalent in the field (Thornton and Ocasio, 1999; Scott et al., 2000). Scholars 
later introduced the idea that conflicting logics can co-exist in the same field for longer periods 
of time and focused on the conditions supporting this long term persistence. For example, 
Marquis and Lounsbury (2007) show how competing logics result in industry segmentation and a 
corresponding variation in practices; Bjerregaard and Jonasson (2013) describe a similar form of 
selective segregation of competing logics at the firm level. Other literature suggests that the 
conflict between alternative logics can remain unresolved. Greenwood et al. (2011) labelled a 
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situation where incompatible logics co-exist for a lengthy period of time in a truce as “enduring 
institutional complexity” (2011: 323). Truces allow for a settlement between conflicting logics 
(Meyer and Hammerschmid, 2006) and the establishment of new forms of organization (Rao et 
al., 2000). They explicate how meaningful social action occurs when different actors are guided 
by competing logics as in the case of physicians and managers in health care (Reay and Hinings, 
2005; 2009).  
The idea of truce introduces the notion that arrangements can be transient and that 
‘armistices’ between conflicting logics can be reworked. The issue has been discussed by authors 
such as Van Gestel and Hillebrand (2011) and Dunn and Jones (2010). The latter examined the 
long term co-existence of two competing logics (care versus science) in the field of medical 
education from 1910 to 2005. The repeated oscillation between the two competing field level 
logics suggests the same clash is repeatedly solved and re-solved over time. While these studies 
suggest that truces can be temporary, current conceptualizations do not explicitly theorize about 
the durability of arrangements, their potential reversibility, and the ensuing restoration of past 
arrangements. 
Current studies also fail to shed light on whether the existence of conflicting logics is a 
transitional phase that eventually leads to the emergence of hybrids (e.g., Rao et al., 2005) or if it 
is stable. The problem remains unresolved because the longest duration of existing studies of 
institutional multiplicity barely exceed one generation e.g., Vasudeva et al.(2014) spanned 29 
years while Gestel and Hillebrand (2011) spanned 31.      
While Friedland and Alford’s (1991) original theory highlighted the relationship between 
society, organizational fields and actors, the link between the societal inter-institutional system 
and the field has been under-researched (notable exceptions:  Daudigeos et al. 2013; Vasudeva et 
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al. 2013). Research has concentrated at the field level, and national polities have usually been 
cited only in passing to contextualize the studies. At the same time little empirical work exists on 
how incompatible prescriptions from multiple societal orders generate field level institutional 
complexity (Besharov and Smith, 2014; Raynard and Greenwood, 2014).   
In this paper, we address these gaps using an inductive historical study of community 
pharmacy, with two questions related to institutional complexity:  (1) What happens to field level 
arrangements of institutional logics over time? (2) How can we explain field level variation in 
the durability of arrangements among competing logics? 
By taking an historical approach, we are able to observe how the same issues arise multiple 
times in four different countries in an institutional field that is inherently at the cross roads of 
conflicting logics: community pharmacy. We follow DiMaggio and Powell in defining a field as 
being composed of “those organizations that, in the aggregate, constitute a recognized area of 
institutional life: key suppliers, resource and product consumers, regulatory agencies, and other 
organizations that produce similar services or products” (1983:148). Community pharmacy is an 
excellent field to investigate. First it represents an ‘in between industry’ sitting at the intersection 
of different world views and some of the ‘grand dichotomies’ of Western thought (Bobbio, 1989, 
quoted by Weintraub, 1997:1). Thus it allows us to study the interface among logics and the 
durability of institutional resolutions to conflicting logics. Second, the history of community 
pharmacy spans several hundred years and detailed accounts exist of events in the last two 
centuries (Anderson, 2005). This allows us to examine the phenomenon over a period that 
comprises major shifts in the nature of national and global polities (Jepperson, 2000; 2002). 
Third, community pharmacy allows us to investigate the co-existence of multiple logics rather 
than two only as in most previous historical studies. Finally, by focusing on community 
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pharmacy we can investigate the durability of institutional arrangements in different national 
contexts characterized by a different arrangement of the same institutional logics (e.g., market, 
state, corporate or professionalism) at the inter-institutional level of society. 
   
METHODOLOGY 
We conducted a comparative case study of community pharmacy in the UK, Italy, Sweden 
and the USA. Community pharmacy involves the preparation and dispensing of medications in 
retail establishments as opposed to hospital settings. Thus, community pharmacy is partly about 
selling a product, partly about professional work, and partly about organizing service delivery 
(Goodrick and Reay, 2011).  Our choice of countries reflected our desire to capture variation in 
the embodiment of different logics in pharmacy: the USA and UK embraced a corporate model, 
Italy adopted a professional logic, and Sweden developed a state control model.  We focused in 
particular on the historically contentious topic of ownership and control over dispensing 
activities in pharmacy outlets (i.e., who can sell medicines and what type). 
The design of the research was based on process tracing (George and Bennett, 2005)- an  
approach that generates explanatory models based on a limited number of historical cases. We 
proceeded as follows. In each country we collected background information on pharmacy 
through a combination of interviews and historical document analysis, building an ‘event history 
database’ for each country related to ownership and control of pharmacies (Van de Ven and 
Poole, 1990)2.  We identified events related to disputes over: 1) who could own a pharmacy, 2) 
                                                 
2 We conducted 34 interviews-7 with practicing pharmacists, 4 with professional association 
members, 14 industry and government officials, and 9 academics. We also relied on 
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what could be sold in a pharmacy, and 3) who had the right to sell it. We then met and worked 
together to identify ‘critical events’ during the past 150-200 years in each country relevant to the 
topics under consideration. Next, each of the identified critical events was examined in depth and 
described using a common set of headlines, focusing on recovering ‘who did what and when’. 
We also identified which institutional logics were operating at the time in each country.  For this 
purpose we built on Goodrick and Reay (2011) who argued that institutional arrangements in 
pharmacy have historically reflected a combination of four different logics which can be 
articulated in terms of ideal types: professional, market, corporate, and state.  
Following Thornton et al. (2012), we evaluated logics in relation to each of the ideal 
worlds (logics). In the ideal type professional world, specialized knowledge workers, by right of 
the superior knowledge and altruistic belief system, make decisions for others. This means that 
ownership of pharmacy outlets is confined to members of the profession who dispense 
medications and determine what should be sold. In the consumerist, market-based world, actors 
operate on the principle of free trade and maximization of profit where consumers’ preference 
and choice are paramount. Pharmacies are thus understood as commercial ventures. In the 
corporate world of organized bureaucracies, administrators of organizations design structures 
and systems that ensure predictability and efficiency and employ people to carry out tasks. 
According to this logic, pharmacies are mainly seen as formal hierarchical organizations where 
managers, not professionals, have ultimate authority. Finally, in the ideal state-controlled world, 
the state intervenes directly in public affairs, taking direct responsibility for public health; 
                                                                                                                                                             
parliamentary debates, court decisions, laws, government documents, pharmacy journals, 
pharmacy history books, and media accounts.  
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pharmacies are thus considered as public health establishments. Table 1 summarizes the ideal 
type institutional logics and the associated ownership and control characteristics of pharmacy 
practice.   
[Table 1 about here] 
We analyzed our initial results during two intensive theory building workshops. During the 
first meeting, we examined critical events, details about relevant incidents and assessments of the 
institutional logics operating in each country. The critical events were assessed according to 
impact and temporal leverage, i.e., impact of the critical event relative to its duration (see 
Capoccia and Kelemen, 2007). In the second session, we employed visual methods for building 
theory from multiple case studies. These included a time-ordered matrix, a content analytic table 
and a scatter plot (Miles and Huberman, 1994). We worked inductively between data and 
interpretation until we could identify clear recurring patterns in the data. After formulating our 
initial explanatory conjectures, we chose particularly illustrative cases for in-depth analyses of 
the primary sources — the texts —to build a ‘discursive-event history database’ (Maguire, 2004) 
capturing ‘who said what, and when’. We used the results of this second round of analysis to 
further refine and delimit the emerging conjectures and interpretations and to pursue analytic 
generalization from our findings (Eisenhardt and Graebner, 2007). 
Tables 2-5 present each event related to ownership and control of pharmacy by country.  
For each event, we provide a brief description, the logics involved, and our interpretation of how 
logics were combined. Our tables indicate that in each country the issue of ownership and control 
of pharmacy outlets was provisionally resolved multiple times over the past two centuries.  
Figure 1 provides a visual representation. 
[Tables 2-5 about here; Figure 1 about here] 
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 In the next section, we describe and analyze our findings over time and for each country, 
building our argument in an inductive and incremental way. Given space constraints, we 
developed an analytic narrative for particularly apt instances that illustrate our arguments. We 
then summarize our analysis in the discussion. 
 
MULTIPLE LOGICS IN COMMUNITY PHARMACY 
UK: Combining professional, corporate and market logics 
At the time of writing, in the UK ownership of a pharmacy can be by pharmacists or any 
other collective subjects (e.g., corporations), provided that a licensed pharmacist supervises the 
dispensing of medicines. This ownership principle has been repeatedly confirmed through a 
number of legal challenges in the last two centuries. We examine two important historical 
developments that illustrate how the question of ownership was addressed:  (1) the establishment 
of corporate pharmacies in the 1880s, (2) the Dickson case, circa 1968.  
In the 1830s, attempting to resolve the long-standing rivalry between doctors, apothecaries 
(‘doctors of the poor’ who prepared and dispensed medications) and chemists (shop owners 
selling drugs and remedies), the British government began to regulate the profession of medicine 
and dispensing. While chemists had no desire to become ‘professional men’ and ‘wanted to be 
left alone to carry on making money’ (Holloway, 1991:108) they eventually agreed to form the 
Pharmaceutical Society of Great Britain to protect their business interests and increase their 
respectability. The introduction of the Pharmacy Act in 1868 restricted the ‘sale of poisons’ to 
‘registered individuals’ who owned and operated an independent shop.  
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During the 1870s, however, a number of limited companies started selling medicines using 
a loophole in the existing ‘Widow Act’. They claimed that on the death of a qualified pharmacist, 
the ‘qualification vested in his person’ could be passed to his widow or children, provided a 
registered pharmacist was an employee. This effectively broke the principle of pharmacist 
ownership, and opened up the possibility for large dealers, co-operatives and supermarkets to 
enter the market and ‘unfairly’ compete based on scale efficiencies.  
The Pharmaceutical Society challenged these actions in court. In 1878, they brought action 
against a retail establishment owned by a non-professional but run by a licensed chemist. 
Consequent legal wrangling led to a decision that it was not unlawful for a qualified person to 
sell ‘poisons’ on behalf of a company, provided that such person was suitably qualified. This was 
despite the Pharmaceutical Society’s claims that “professionalism is destroyed when unqualified 
laymen, driven solely by the profit motive, acquire the ownership and the control of professional 
enterprise.” (Holloway, 1991: 274). Jesse Boots was one of the first to take advantage of this 
ruling and began to employ chemists to open satellite stores. By 1883 Boots Cash Chemists had 
opened 10 branches; by 1906, 329. The trend continued so that by 2000, almost 60% of 
pharmacy outlets in the UK were owned by small multiples and large chains (Anderson, 2005). 
 
Analysis 
The narratives above provide excellent examples of how different institutional logics are 
made to co-exist. The Pharmaceutical Society was itself the result of a compromise that 
combined the professional and market logics. In 1880, large corporations also wanted to combine 
these two existing logics to capitalize on the employment of skilled administrators to facilitate 
predictability, efficiency and prosperity. Thus, these new economic actors (companies and co-
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operatives) elevated the salience of the corporate logic within the field of pharmacy. However, 
their activities did not lead to the replacement of professionalism and personal ownership; on the 
contrary, all three logics (professional, market and corporate) were made to co-exist thus creating 
space for corporations, co-operatives and pharmacist owners. The court case illustrates how the 
logics could be legally combined; it also illustrates how such work is often carried out through 
discourse. The Pharmaceutical Society continued to resist the extension of professionalism to a 
collective actor. In allowing this contested interpretation, the court declared that in certain cases 
corporations can provide professional services through their members 
UK: Contesting the truce  
Next we compare the previous case with another famous controversy -- the Dickson case. 
This case arose from the ongoing conflict between trade and profession that drove the 
Pharmaceutical Society to argue against commercial development that could negatively affect 
the professional standing of its members (Anderson 2002; Taylor and Harding, 2001). In the 
early 1960s, the society actively tried to restrict the location of pharmacy activities by revising its 
professional code of conduct. They proposed physically distinct premises for new pharmacies 
and restricted all pharmacies to the sale of pharmaceutical, professional and ‘traditional’ 
chemist’s goods (primarily toiletries, cosmetics, and photographic items). A motion, strongly 
supported by small owners, was put forward in 1965.  Robert Dickson, then retail director of the 
large chain Boots the Chemist (see above), sought an injunction against the motion on the 
grounds that it was outside the power of the society and could constitute an unlawful restriction 
of trade. The resulting court case was followed by an appeal where the Society argued: 
It is claimed, I think rightly, that pharmacy is a profession [...] So most pharmacists act in a 
dual capacity, combining retail trading with their professional work. …The present policy 
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of the council of the society is to restrict trading activities so far as is economically 
practicable as well as to ensure that such activities are carried on in a manner compatible 
with the professional character of pharmacists. (House of Lords, 1970 in Applebe and 
Wingfield, 2005: 392). 
 
The court ruled that the Pharmaceutical Society had no power to control or restrict the 
trading of certain products in pharmacies ‘which did not interfere with the proper performance of 
professional pharmaceutical duties’ thus restricting the Society to issues of professionalism 
(Applebe and Wingfield, 2005: 393).  
 
Analysis 
In the above controversy, the Society tried to contest the institutional arrangement 
established in 1880.  This is significant because it appears that these logics co-existed for almost 
80 years although not necessarily in harmony; individual proprietors, large chains, and the 
Society continued to argue, although these minor skirmishes did not challenge the existing 
armistice. Unlike the previous case, we observe material as well as a discursive activity. While in 
1880 the Society tried to act on the meaning of ‘professional’ person, here the target was the 
material constitution of pharmacy. The Society tried to undo the existing arrangement by 
spatially segregating the different logics; the pharmacy as a professional outlet needed to be 
separated from the ‘commercial enterprise’. By rejecting the motion, the Court effectively 
ratified the material co-existence of the three logics that were now discursively and materially 
‘joined at the hip’.  
In the following sections we compare the UK experience with Italy and then the USA and 
Sweden. The comparison between cases allows us to shed light on the durability and nature of 
institutional multiplicity.  
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Italy: From professionalism to commerce and back 
Pharmacy in Italy is guided by Napoleon’s Regulation (1806) that conceived pharmacies as 
public health agencies and imposed strict regulation with regards to their ownership and 
operation. Although geographic variations consequently arose, the ‘one pharmacist-one 
pharmacy model’ prevailed. In 1888, a new law was introduced to allow unrestricted 
establishment of pharmacies, except for the requirement of an approved pharmacist as director of 
each shop. This clashed with existing law allowing many pharmacists to sell or transfer the 
pharmacy to their children. The discourse supported the free market, and public health -- 
underlining the State’s responsibility to assure hygienic and healthy conditions.  
The 1888 law produced a sharp increase in the number of pharmacies and the creation of 
small chains. However, problems arose due to the sale of pharmaceuticals by droghieri, owners 
of general stores traditionally selling sweets, soaps, flowers and oils. As a countermove, 
pharmacists started to sell all sorts of other goods. To address the blurring of commerce and 
profession the government issued a regulation in 1901, restricting pharmacies to running a 
drogheria only if the premises were clearly separated from the actual place where medicines 
were dispensed. The law had limited effect and pharmacies continued to sell a wide variety of 
products, undermining the professional image of the pharmacist.  
In response, the government established a mandatory professional association that 
identified legally approved pharmacists (those who could prepare and dispense medications). In 
1913, the government yielded to pressure from pharmacists and overturned the 1888 law, 
returning to the old regime of ‘one pharmacy- one pharmacist’. Owning a pharmacy was 
confirmed as a personal non-tradable concession that could be obtained through public 
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competition and expired only upon death or retirement. Licensed pharmacists could own only 
one pharmacy. This model was named the ‘Mediterranean model’ of pharmacy and heralded as a 
victory of professionalism over commerce. The dominant argument proponents used was that 
pharmacies should provide a highly professionalized service that protects and benefits the users.  
 
Analysis 
Similar to the UK case, the 1888 Italian law attempted to combine the professional and 
market logics, although the public health concern (state logic) was also strongly present. Similar 
to the UK, the pharmacists resisted, claiming that the new organizational form of pharmacies 
would affect the ‘purity’ of their professional mission to the detriment of public health. Also 
similar to the UK case, multiple logics remained active throughout the period. Instead of a new 
dominant logic defeating and substituting for the previous one, several logics continued to co-
exist, albeit not in a situation of harmony. The market logic did not eradicate those of 
professionalism or the state; instead the logics remained in tension. The Italian case also shows 
that such arrangements are potentially reversible. In the course of two decades, the logics of the 
market, state and professionalism were joined and separated. As we discuss below, this 
introduces the idea that ‘restoration’ and turning back the clock are at times a possibility in 
institutional change, although such a possibility has seldom been considered. 
Italy: The same Issues Return  
In Italy, the very issues addressed at the end of the 1800s reappeared in the early 2000s 
using the same types of arguments and rhetoric. Beginning in the late 1990s, different Italian 
governments cautiously attempted to liberalize the sale of drugs. For example, pharmacies could 
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compete on price with regards to over-the-counter (OTC) medicines. These innovations were 
strongly resisted by the national association of pharmacists, all of whom were pharmacy owners.  
In 2005, the EU challenged the Italian government, claiming that the medicine market was 
in breach of the right of establishment and free movement of capital. The Italian government 
responded with a further liberalization of non-prescription drug sales outside pharmacies. The 
new law allowed for specialized shops called parafarmacia and ‘drug corners’ in large 
supermarkets where OTC remedies (but not prescription drugs) could be sold in the presence of a 
pharmacist.  
As before, the arrangement was soon disputed. In 2009, after a strong lobbying effort by 
the pharmacist owners, a new law was proposed to completely liberalize the sale of OTC drugs --  
prescription drugs would be confined to traditional pharmacies, and OTC drugs could be sold in 
all retail establishments, undermining the viability of parafarmacias. This radical measure was 
not approved. Instead, the government allowed traditional pharmacies to provide new services as 
part of the National Health Service (from health promotion to carrying out tests), a move that 
reinforced traditional pharmacies as medical and public health establishments. At the same time, 
the new parafarmacias were prevented from using logos that could be confused with that of 
traditional pharmacies, so that people could easily identify ‘real pharmacies.’  
 
Analysis 
This new chapter of Italian pharmacy ownership confirms some of our previous 
observations and adds a few new interesting elements. First, the debate in the early 20th century 
is strikingly similar to that which took place a century earlier; the same issues keep returning. In 
2006, the government again tried to combine the professional, market and state logics. Second, 
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as in previous cases, the solution was strongly resisted by one of the groups, indicating again that 
institutional logics are often associated with organized interests. In this Italian case, symbolic 
strategies were used in addition to discursive and material ones. Purity was preserved by 
materially and symbolically decoupling the logics; ‘parafarmacias’ were kept distinct from ‘real 
pharmacies’ discursively (by their name), location, and even their logos. Finally, the conflict 
between logics in the field reflects a broader clash of polities in the country (Jepperson, 2002). 
The dispute over pharmacy was part of a government attempt to debunk entrenched privileges 
and introduce elements of marketization into Italian society. In this case, the EU acted as a 
representative and promoter of the market logic; its influence shifted the balance of forces in the 
field, encouraging conflict to emerge.   
 
USA and Sweden: A Pattern Emerging 
In the USA, the problem of ownership of pharmacies was resolved through legislation in 
individual states and through rulings of the Supreme Court. Until the 1920s, there was no 
restriction on ownership of pharmacies. The first state to restrict ownership to registered 
pharmacists was New York in 1922; this was to prevent pharmacies from selling intoxicating 
liquors, thus circumventing the Volstead Act (‘prohibition’).  
A critical event impacting pharmacy ownership took place in 1927 when Pennsylvania 
passed a law supported by organized pharmacists to prevent chain drug stores from increasing. 
The law required all new drug stores to be owned either by a registered pharmacist or a 
corporation in which all stockholders were pharmacists. Similar to the New York law, it was 
based on concerns regarding public health, arguing that professional managers could be unable to 
meet legal responsibilities because of requirements to obey nonprofessional owners (Kremers et 
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al., 1963: 274).  In 1928, this law was overturned by the Supreme Court because ‘mere 
ownership in a corporation, owning and operation of a drug store, can have no real or substantial 
relation to the public health; and that the act in question creates an unreasonable and unnecessary 
restriction upon private business.’ This Supreme Court decision eliminated legal constraints on 
chains owning pharmacies.    
The issue of pharmacy ownership was debated again in 1964. The U.S. Senate Anti-trust 
subcommittee held hearings on the issue of physician owned pharmacies. While no federal 
legislation was enacted, a number of states passed laws championed by organized pharmacy 
restricting physician ownership of pharmacies. The most restrictive was in North Dakota where 
ownership and operation of pharmacies was limited to licensed pharmacists or corporations in 
which at least two pharmacists were directors. In 1973, the U.S. Supreme Court overturned its 
earlier 1928 decision on the rights of states to limit the free market, arguing that ‘the State was 
well within its authority to legislate against what it found to be injurious practices.’ This overturn 
had little impact outside of North Dakota, where ownership of pharmacies remains restricted to 
pharmacists.  
Swedish pharmacies were corporately owned until very recently, but the story, is strikingly 
different from the USA. From 1971 to 2010, Swedish pharmacies were owned by a State-owned 
large corporation. Before this time, pharmacists retained a monopoly to sell pharmaceuticals 
through a system of personal charters with the king. In 1913, a new distribution system for 
pharmaceuticals was discussed; three alternatives were proposed: an open market system with no 
government involvement, a system of personal charters, or a nationalized system under 
government ownership (Öberg, 2003). Arguments favouring nationalization were focused on 
guaranteeing enough pharmacies were available to meet public demand, even in rural areas. In 
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contrast, most pharmacy owners actively supported retaining the personal charter system. After 
almost twenty years of debate on the pros and cons of nationalization, the government decided to 
retain the system of personal charters.  
The same issue arose in the late 1960s. The number of pharmacies had increased 
substantially; however, most of the new pharmacies were in urban areas with good consumer 
potential while only a few were in rural zones with declining populations (Öberg, 2003). At the 
same time, a progressive fee system had introduced strong state control over both pharmacies 
and their earnings. The system provided employee pensions and support of less profitable 
pharmacies. Thus, although the pharmacies were still privately owned, the government closely 
regulated the pharmaceutical market. Faced with limited business opportunities, the association 
of pharmacy owners entered in negotiation with the government and all pharmacies were 
nationalized in 1971 through the establishment of the National Corporation of Swedish 
Pharmacies (Apoteket AB). Pharmacy owners became public employees. The government took 
full control of pharmaceutical sales since it was no longer concerned with the profitability of 
private pharmacies (Öberg, 2003). Cost-effectiveness increased because of the one-channel 
distribution system, and the number of pharmacies increased from 600 to 900 with new locations 
determined by public health rather than market considerations.  
By 2000, Apoteket was the fourth largest pharmacy chain in Europe despite operating only 
within Sweden. The situation soon changed dramatically. In 2004, the CEO of a Stockholm 
company selling health foods carefully choreographed an infringement of the existing law. After 
placing a newspaper advertisement announcing that “A crime against the Medicine Act will be 
committed on Stureplan at 10 o'clock on Wednesday”, he started selling nicotine medicines to 
his customers. He argued it was not sensible that you could buy cigarettes but not nicotine 
21 
 
chewing gum in his shop. In an interview he added that his small company wanted “to start a 
pharmacy, because we are convinced that the monopoly of the Apoteket AB will vanish.” 
(DN.se, 2005). 
The resulting court case questioned whether the Swedish regulations were in accordance 
with EU law. The court ruled that the monopoly was unlawful because it discriminated against 
products from other Member States (EU, 2005). Following the ruling, Apoteket was dismantled 
and many of its outlets were sold in clusters to equity firms or to an association of Swedish 
entrepreneurs. The newly formed Swedish Pharmacy Association hailed the reform as a victory 
for consumers because it “improved the quality of service to the customer” (Swedish Pharmacy 
Association, 2010: 2). Today more than 85% of the market is controlled by a few chains and 
equity firms, and Apoteket operates approximately 300 pharmacies to guarantee continuity of 
service in rural areas.  
 
Analysis.  
The USA and Sweden cases help to show a clearer pattern. As in the UK and Italy, we see 
the same logics being combined, separated and re-combined over time. In the USA and Sweden, 
the logics coexisted for long periods; but the fact they were uncontested did not mean that they 
had disappeared. Instead, different institutional logics remained active for long periods, fuelled 
by specific actors representing recognizable organized interests; alternative institutional logics 
were joined and re-joined repeatedly. For example, in the Swedish case public health interests 
and those of organized pharmacists created conflict that was addressed and resolved multiple 
times. 
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In the USA, as in the UK, organized pharmacists tried to prevent the emergence of 
corporate pharmacies, an organizational form that allowed professional and corporate logics to 
co-exist side by side. The effort was of a material nature (forming chains) and carried out by 
institutional actors (the pharmacist association) utilizing mostly discursive strategies and 
endorsing the power of the law. In both cases, however, the attempt failed as it was perceived 
(and constructed) as an attempt to limit the free market.  
Overall, we see that the dynamics of logic interconnections (and re-connections) were 
similar across countries, but the logics made to co-exist were different. While almost the same 
rhetorical argument was used in all countries (defence of the profession, protection of consumer 
interest, preservation of public welfare), completely different solutions arose. This illustrates our 
earlier suggestion that particular types of effort are required to make conflicting logics co-exist, 
and the outcome cannot be considered in isolation from the polity environment in which the 
process takes place.   
 
DISCUSSION 
We examined historical changes in the ownership and control of community pharmacies in 
the UK, Italy, Sweden and the USA to shed light on what happens to institutional arrangements 
designed to resolve ongoing conflicts between competing logics. Our study is one of the first to 
combine a historical, international and comparative perspective. We advance our understanding 
of institutional complexity in three ways: 1) We show that multiple logics can co-exist in 
“uneasy truces” over extended periods of time, and suggest that this temporary form of 
compromise can be conceptualized as an “institutional knot” -- emphasizing that logics can be 
combined while remaining demonstrably separate; 2) We explain the durability of field level 
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“institutional knots” by nesting them in the dynamics at the inter-institutional societal level. 3) 
We highlight that managing institutional complexity agency at the field/societal interface is just 
as important as agency at the individual and organizational levels. 
Look what’s back: reoccurrence and institutional complexity  
Our first contribution stems from our finding that both conflicts and their solutions 
repeatedly reoccurred; similar conflicts were fought with similar arguments, despite decades 
having elapsed since the first occurrence, with solutions that resembled historical predecessors. 
Our study provides empirical evidence that institutional multiplicity can endure over a long 
period of time without logics becoming hybridized, blended or eliminated. While the different 
logics in our study were combined to constitute relatively stable institutional arrangements, they 
remained visibly different and recognizable. The uneasy and often conflictual co-existence of 
different logics in a condition of temporary truce did not result in their blending; the ongoing 
existence of conflict likely contributed to keeping the logics distinct. For example, 
notwithstanding the appearance of chain stores that embody the corporate logic, the logic of 
professionalism continued to orient the practice of pharmacists in all countries studied. 
One way to conceptualize this state of affairs is to introduce the idea of an ‘institutional 
knot’. This term captures the idea that different threads comprising a knot can remain visible and 
recognizable over long periods of time without hybridization or dominance taking place. We 
define a “knot” as the institutional arrangements that allow different logics to co-exist at the field 
level in a provisionally durable state. For example, the 1880 agreement that a company could 
own a pharmacy as long as a ‘professional’ was present at all times represented a “knot,” tying 
together the professional, corporate, and market logics. A “knot” is more than a truce that 
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separates “dueling logics” (Battilana and Dorado, 2010: 1427), or contenders that ‘agree to 
disagree’ (Reay and Hinings, 2005; 2009). “Knots” are the outcome of “knotting” which 
involves the creating and stabilizing of institutional arrangements that involves agency and 
effort.  Institutional “knot” and “knotting” also highlight our findings that institutional 
arrangements can be undone and redone. This is reflected in the reactivation of conflict (van 
Gestel and Hillenbrand, 2011) and also in the ability of the new arrangement to replicate past 
arrangements and restore past regimes. Italy is a case in point. As we showed, in Italy, 
professional, market and corporate logics were tied together in 1888 only to be untied 1910. In 
effect, the government restored the ancient regime. 
While the metaphor of “knot” has some similarity to that of “constellations of logics” 
(Goodrick and Reay, 2011) and the idea of “critical junctures” (Hogan, 2006), we believe it 
represents a theoretical advancement. While both the metaphor of “knot” and “constellations of 
logics” capture a combination of logics (Goodrick and Reay, 2011), the noun knot also invokes 
the cognate notion of ‘knotting’ which introduces an element of agency and process into the 
static metaphor of constellation which only represents the state of co-existence. The idea of 
‘critical junctures’ suggests that once an institutional option is selected, it becomes progressively 
more difficult to return to the initial point (Capoccia and Kelmen, 2007; Hogan, 2006). We 
suggest the concept of critical junctures should be expanded to include the possibility of 
institutional reversibility as shown in our findings. Critical junctures thus could be thought as 
particular times when the knotting is problematized and the arrangements confirmed or modified 
– their ‘criticality’ and path-dependent properties remaining an empirical question.  
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Explaining durability  
We found that which knots are tied and which knots can be naturalized and made durable, 
is tightly connected to the inter-institutional system making up each polity. Thus, our study 
extends recent work by Besharov and Smith (2014) on contested multiplicity and Raynard and 
Greenwood (2014) on volatile complexity by addressing their call for more attention to the 
institutional landscape and its implications for organizational response. Our observation of 
different degrees of field-level institutional complexity in the same industry in different countries 
allows us to link complexity with the inter-institutional system in each society and in each 
historical era. Our study, therefore, complements Besharov and Smith’s (2014) analysis by 
pushing our understanding about the drivers of variation in institutional complexity beyond the 
level of the field in two ways. 
First, we show that the levels of volatility, contestation, and conflict differed both among 
countries and within countries in different historical eras. In the USA conflict emerged only in 
two periods (1927-1928 and 1963-1973) and cemented the preeminence of the logic ‘couple’ 
corporation-market over the profession and the state; however, in Italy conflict erupted in seven 
periods with radically changing frontlines (profession, state and corporation took the lead 
successively). The UK and Sweden sit in-between, with the UK following a path similar to that 
of the USA but with a higher involvement of the state and Sweden experiencing radical change 
twice (in 1970 and 2009). Second, our analysis suggests that whether different logics can co-
exist and symbolically occupy the same “cultural space” (Thornton et al., 2012:63) is related to 
the specific discursive and material institutions embedded within each society at a particular 
point in history. Referring to Chandler’s (1962) case studies on multi-divisionalization of 
26 
 
American corporations, Thornton (2002) observed that in the USA “markets embody logics that 
are complementary to corporation.” Similarly, in our USA case, the idea of free markets and 
property rights supported corporate chains in taking over the field and making pharmacy 
professionals employees. However, in our Swedish case, the logics of the market and the 
corporation were maintained separately until the EU imposed liberalization; the state logic was 
persistently a thread in the knot, tied variously with the market and professional logics in a 
coherent whole.   
Our study suggests that complementarity among logics is rooted in societal level 
phenomena, and can be understood more fully in light of modern polity models. This approach 
extends concepts identified by Besharov and Smith (2014) in relationship to the field level. For 
example, Jepperson (2002) identified two dimensions of polities: collective agency 
(‘statist’=high versus ‘societal’=low) and organization of society (‘corporate’=high versus 
‘associational’= low). High collective agency, at the level of the inter-institutional system, is 
similar to Besharov and Smith’s idea of low degree of simultaneous centrality of multiple logics 
at the field level: high collective agency implies state centrality in the polity while a low degree 
implies that one logic is core and others are peripheral. At the level of the inter-institutional 
system, high organization of society refers to the organization of interests to provide compatible 
and jurisdictionally non-overlapping prescriptions for action, similar to Besharov and Smith’s 
idea of high degree of compatibility at the field level.  
Liberal polities such as the UK and the USA are low on both dimensions, i.e. collective 
agency is not organized around one central institution such as the state but is left to the free play 
of societal forces, while at the same time, interests compete since social order is not planned as 
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in a well-defined ‘corporate’ body. As shown in Figure 23, the USA consistently occupies the 
same liberal position among modern polity models. The UK, although considered a paradigmatic 
case of liberal polity, differs from the USA because the state assumes a greater role – although 
this has changed in the past century, hence the line. In our study, at the US community pharmacy 
field level, the free play of social forces led to the domination of the market-corporate logics 
while the profession and the state were left with crumbs of power. In the UK, the advent of 
multiples (chains stores) was more disruptive than in the USA (see the dotted arrow in Figure 3) 
both because the pharmacy profession had a higher standing and centrality and because the state 
intervened in a more confrontational way.  
Nordic social-corporate polities such as Sweden, in contrast, leave collective agency to 
the free play of social forces but are geared towards a corporatist approach that delimits the 
influence of society – Sweden has the highest score for ‘neocorporatism’ according to Hicks and 
Kenworthy (1998). In this model, the state assumes the role of an arena available for coordinated 
collective agency rather than a ‘statist’ actor centralizing coordination in its bureaucracy (Evans 
et al., 1985). Figure 2 shows the position of Sweden among modern polities, accounting for the 
rather recent change of its integration in the EU. In the Swedish pharmacy case, because 
collective agency was located in society, professionals freely chose the state as the most 
appropriate institutional arrangement for their endeavor, enacting the typical social-corporate 
Nordic model. The role of the EU was critical to break such a tightly knit arrangement of 
national societal forces. It did so by imposing the more liberal order of its multilateral 
constitution—a move that in Figure 3 shows the field abandoning the corporate state guaranteed 
                                                 
3 The figure is based on Jepperson (2002) with the axis changed to facilitate comparison to Figure 1 in Besharov and 
Smith’s (2014: 371). 
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consensus. Italy, as a polity, according to Jepperson (2000: 31), presents a statist aspiration, but 
in practice society has “colonized a weak state apparatus” akin to an “archipelago of loosely 
connected institutions.” Italy, accordingly, lies in the middle of the corporatist continuum 
(Vasudeva et al., 2013). As a ‘weak state’ (Ranci, 1987), Italy has had many competing paths 
and an incoherent polity characterized, in the language of Whitley (2000), by varied business 
systems from fragmented, to locally family-community coordinated and to state organized—a 
condition of polity-instability represented in Figure 2  with a ‘wobbling’ arrow. With respect to 
pharmacy, such incoherent polity formation led to a jurisdictional overlap among societal orders 
and a weakness towards external influences by powerful nations, leading to instability in the 
pharmacy field. The dotted line in Figure 3 represents the Italian pharmacy field starting at a 
point similar to Sweden with the profession dominating, moving towards the abrupt introduction 
of the corporate and market logics, followed by the restoration of the previous order and recent 
efforts by the EU to introduce market-like elements despite the continuous preeminence of the 
state-backed profession.  
 
[Figure 2 and 3 about here] 
 
Our data, therefore, suggest that the durability of knots in each polity was related to the 
relationship between institutional orders transcending field boundaries. The strength of certain 
institutional orders (Friedland and Alford, 1991) was translated at the field level and actively 
used to uphold or problematize existing arrangements. The inter-institutional system seemed to 
create enabling and constraining conditions favouring one result over another—a corridor of 
possibilities within which knotting activity can unfold. This occurred in the UK, where the 
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prevailing liberalist orientations played out locally, preventing the knot between corporate and 
professional logics being undone. Thus, our findings are consistent with sociological approaches 
that explain the stability and durability of social arrangements in terms of interplay between local 
and global phenomena through processes of anchoring (Swidler, 2001), and embeddeding 
(Granovetter, 1985). Our study adds an interesting and counterintuitive slant to these concepts. 
Contrary to the view that the more balanced the forces are in society, the more stable 
relationships among contenders will be at the field level, we find the opposite: the more 
unbalanced logics are at societal level, the less field level knots are contested. We observed that 
when a logic at the societal level was inscribed in a more influential institutional order (i.e. when 
the relationship of the societal logics under tension is unbalanced) then the field-level knot is 
more durable—because a field-level logic derives strength from its dominant position in the 
inter-institutional societal field (e.g., the market logic in the USA). When incompatible societal 
logics are more balanced, the knot at the field level is less durable and more often contested. In 
other words, the less one path dominates in society (Schneiberg, 2007), the more knotting events 
occur at field level.  
The result of balanced incompatible societal logics can be conceptualized in terms of 
“crises waiting to happen”. We argue under such circumstances the underlying tension between 
logics at the field level is not resolved through knotting but rather is only temporarily appeased. 
The underlying tension creates potential institutional faults that traverse the field and meet at 
particular hotspots. Like geological faults, these latent conflicts remain dormant until they 
become active again, giving rise to new controversy around certain specific issues. Although 
when such crises will occur and how they will be resolved is difficult to predict, we can suggest 
where institutional conflicts are likely to reoccur by examining societal level complexity among 
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institutional orders. For example, in countries such as Italy and many others sharing the 
‘Mediterranean Model’, where pharmacy chains are not allowed, we expect the ownership of 
pharmacies will continue to be a salient issue given the continuing transposition of liberal ideas 
institutionalized in the world polity (Drori et al., 2006; Delmestri, 2009).   
 
A renewed focus on agency 
Our study and the metaphor of knotting extends a concept developed at a more micro level 
by Lindberg and Czarniawska (2006) to the institutional level; it also foregrounds the dimension 
of agency that is required for the combination of logics at the field level. By emphasizing 
agency, we respond to the concern that “despite recognition that institutional complexity can 
arise in – and from – everyday practice, [the] suggested responses to such permanent complexity 
are largely structural” (Smets and Jarzabkowski, 2013). We show that the establishment, 
contestation and defense of institutional knots stem from identifiable and localized social and 
material processes and events, implying institutional work (Lawrence and Suddaby, 2006). The 
work of knotting and unknotting logics together is empirically accessible. For example, almost 
all the events described above unfold in the forums of courts, parliaments and assemblies. Here 
specific individuals speak on behalf of “macro actors” such as the Pharmacy association or the 
EU. Our study demonstrates that large scale phenomena such as making logics coexist at the 
field level can be examined empirically if we focus on the appropriate forums. 
Our study also provides a glimpse of the mechanisms underlying the stabilization and 
contestation of institutional knots. We observed that institutional knots were stabilized and 
defended against attempts to untie them through discursive and material means. Similar to 
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scholars focusing on the discursive dynamics associated with institutional change (e.g., Maguire 
and Hardy, 2009; Brown et al., 2012) we found that discursive activities were featured centrally 
in both knotting and unknotting events. For example, knotting was often pursued through the 
circulation of texts and discourses that avowed the benefit and value of the new arrangements, 
making the new institutional arrangement appear coherent and rational. Unknotting, on the other 
hand, implies problematizing the discursive foundations that support a particular arrangement by 
highlighting negative, undesirable, or inappropriate consequences (Maguire and Hardy, 2009). In 
our cases, the most common strategy used by professional pharmacists was to first prevent, and 
later undo the knotting of different logics.  
Consistent with recent work suggesting that material elements play a greater role in 
carrying logics than usually accepted (e.g., Jones et al., 2013; Lindberg and Walter, 2013), we 
found evidence that material practices supported continued distinction between the different 
logics even as they were knotted together. For example, in the UK, the law established that a 
licensed pharmacist must be present in the pharmacy at all times – a material way to ensure that 
the professional and market logics are tightly knit. In all countries, the spaces where practices 
belonging to different logics were carried out were clearly separated: the pharmacist stays 
‘behind the counter’ where the ‘real medicines’ are, while the rest of the merchandise stays at the 
front of the shop.  
 
CONCLUSIONS 
Our study suggests that shedding light on how institutional complexity is addressed and 
temporarily resolved requires a focus on more than one level or polity. Consideration must be 
given to actions and events at the organizational and field levels and at the interface between 
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field and broader polity (Vasudeva et. al., 2013). By examining this interface, our study 
identifies a relationship between the type of equilibrium existing between institutional orders at 
the level of societies, and the durability of ‘knotted’ arrangements at the field level. Our findings 
suggest that institutional complexity should be studied not only at the organisational level (by 
examining events at the interface of organizations and the field) but also at the field level (how 
field-level arrangements are anchored to higher societal orders).  
Our study opens interesting directions for future research. First, the idea that institutional 
pluralism is a nested phenomenon could be further refined to examine the dynamics between 
organizational, field, and societal levels. Second, researchers could build on the metaphor of 
‘knot’ to examine the dynamics and conditions of the durability of these arrangements, including 
the potential reversibility of institutional arrangements. We suggest that these images of knot, 
knotting and unknotting have considerable heuristic value that could be exploited further. 
Finally, we hope that other researchers will advance our ideas about boundary conditions at 
inter-institutional level and their effect on the ways that a knot is weaved at different points in 
time and across different polities.  
Although to our knowledge this study is the first of its kind in adopting an historical and 
international comparative design that examines variation at the level of the inter-institutional 
system of society, it has a number of limitations. First, all four countries studied belong to the 
Western world, sharing the same medical and pharmaceutical traditions. A comparison with 
polities lying outside of this spectrum, e.g. China, could offer interesting insights. Second, the 
grand historical view of our study forced us to concentrate on the essential abstract features of 
critical events as related to each other, and less on the local details of institutional work 
performed by agentic individuals. A more micro-level analysis of knotting events may reveal 
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interesting processual aspects of knotting work. Third, the extent of competing logics in 
community pharmacy may not be generalizable to other fields, although we believe that findings 
would be similar in societal sectors such as health care or education. Community pharmacy has 
so far been understudied, despite its richness for researchers. We hope that others will further 
research in these regards.  
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Table 1: Ideal Type of Institutional Logic and Associated Characteristics of Ownership and Control 
 
Characteristics Professional logic Corporate  
Logic 
Market logic State logic 
A. Ownership of a 
pharmacy 
Ownership of 
pharmacies is 
restricted to 
pharmacists.  
 
 
 
Pharmacies are 
owned by 
corporations 
(chains).  
There are no 
restrictions on who 
can own a 
pharmacy.  
Pharmacies are state 
owned.  
B. Establishment of a 
pharmacy   
Professional 
associations 
determine where 
pharmacies should 
be established.   
 
The establishment 
of a pharmacy is 
determined by  
management  
The establishment of 
a pharmacy reflects 
customer demand 
for services.  
The state determines 
where pharmacies 
will be established.  
C. Goods sold in a 
pharmacy 
The type of goods 
sold in a pharmacy 
reflects the desire of 
professional 
association 
 
The type of goods 
sold in a pharmacy 
reflects 
management 
decisions.  
The type of goods 
sold in pharmacy 
reflects customer 
demands.  
The state determines 
what good will be 
sold in a pharmacy.  
D. Entry to pharmacy 
practice  
The necessary 
credentials to 
practice pharmacy 
are determined by 
professional 
association.  
 
Management 
determines the 
credentials 
necessary to 
practice pharmacy.   
Any credentials to 
practice pharmacy 
reflect what 
customers demand.       
The necessary 
credentials to 
practice pharmacy 
are determined by 
the state.  
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Table 2: Critical Events Related to Pharmacy Ownership in the UK 
 
 
Year  Critical Event Brief Description Logics  Interpretation 
1868 
National Pharmacy 
Act  
Ownership and sale of poisons (medications) were limited to registered 
pharmacists.  
Professional 
Market 
Law combined professional and market 
logics.   
1880 
House of Lords 
decision: London 
Provincial Supply 
Assoc. v. 
Pharmaceutical 
Society 
House of Lords ruled that “a body corporate could keep an open shop… if 
qualified persons perform the sale” allowing a corporation to own a 
pharmacy. 
Professional 
Market 
Corporate  
Court decision separates professional 
qualifications from ownership, joining the 
corporate logic with professional and 
market.       
1908 
National Poisons 
and Pharmacy Act 
Only registered individuals (not corporations) could use the title 
pharmacist. Corporations could use the term Chemist & Druggist if the 
business’ supervising pharmacist was on board of directors. 
Professional 
Market 
Corporate 
Law strengthened professional logic and 
interwove it with corporate by limiting 
ownership to corporations with a 
pharmacist on the board of directors.  
1953 
Court of Appeals: 
Pharmaceutical 
Society v. Boots 
Court of Appeals decision on whether new self-service system in Boots 
(biggest chain in UK) violated the legal requirement that sale of 
pharmaceutical products must take place in presence of pharmacist.  Court 
rules that contract of sale is at the cash register and thus the practice of self 
service does not violate the law.   
Professional 
Market  
Corporate  
Court decision weakened professional 
logic and strengthened corporate because 
profession no longer controlled sale of 
medications.   
1968 
House of Lord 
judicial decision: 
Dickson v. 
Pharmaceutical 
Society 
House of Lords ruled against Pharmaceutical Society argument that new 
pharmacies only be allowed in separate buildings dedicated to professional 
and traditional goods. Court said: “public has interest in men being able to 
trade freely in the good which they judge the public wants”.   
Professional 
Market 
Corporate 
Court decision meant that professional 
society could not control what was sold in 
a pharmacy. Strengthened market logic 
within existing arrangement.      
1986 
National Health 
Service Act: 
Control of Entry 
Regulation limits opening of a new pharmacy to where “necessary or 
desirable” to secure adequate provision of pharmaceutical services in the 
neighborhood, as judged by NHS.  
Professional  
Market  
Corporate  
State 
 
State regulations replace market 
considerations and corporate desire to 
determine establishment of pharmacies.  
State logic now part of arrangement.     
2005 
National Health 
Services 
(Pharmaceutical 
Regulations)  
Revision of 1986 law on government control of location of new 
pharmacies. This regulation enacted in response to 2003 Office of Fair 
Trading report criticizing market constraints.    
Professional 
Market  
Corporate 
State 
Weakens state influence by reducing 
control over number and location of 
pharmacies. Strengthens market logic.  
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Table 3: Critical Events Related to Pharmacy Ownership in Italy  
 
Year Critical Event Brief Description Logics Interpretation 
1806 
Napoleon’s 
Regulation of 
Pharmacy 
French law imposed to create Health Commission that controlled 
pharmacists’ right to establish pharmacy, but no restriction on location of 
pharmacy. Only pharmacists with university degree can own a pharmacy. 
Sales restricted to items in official pharmacopeia.  
Professional 
Market 
State 
 
Foreign power asserts logic of state as public health 
assurer and joins state logic with the preexisting 
logics of profession, and market.  
1865 
Law 2148 on Public 
Health 
Italian state (unified in 1861) unifies pharmacy regulation across the nation. 
New pharmacies are non-tradable individual right issued by state authorities 
and are restricted to pharmacists with a university degree. Medications only 
sold in pharmacies. 
Professional 
Market 
State  
 
Law strengthens state logic within existing 
arrangement and weakens market.  
1888 
Law 5849 
Crispi/Pagliano on 
Public Health 
Pharmacies are tradable goods distinct from dispensing which is restricted to 
pharmacists. Medications sold only in pharmacies. No restriction on number 
and location of pharmacies. Allows for the creation of chains. 
Professional 
Market 
State 
Law weakens state and professional logics  and 
strengthens market by allowing for trade of 
pharmacies and non-pharmacist ownership.   
1901 
Communication to 
Prefectures of 
Minister of Int 
Affairs  
Owners of pharmacies can sell other kinds of goods only if the premises are 
clearly distinct from those where medicines are sold.  
Professional 
Market 
State 
Strengthens professional and state logic in existing 
arrangement.  
1910-
1913 
Institution of 
Professional Order 
and Law 468 
(Giolitti)  
Reverses 1888 regulations. Pharmacy establishment controlled by state in 
competitions for a charter which cannot be sold or inherited.  Only 
pharmacists can compete. Existing tradable and inheritable pharmacies 
allowed to operate until 1933 (Fascism extends it to 1946 and the Liberation 
government to 1968).   
Professional 
Market 
State 
 
Law strengthens state logic and interweaves it with 
professional logic by regulating pharmacies and 
restricting ownership to pharmacists.  Weakens 
market logic (allows for existing stores) 
1968 
Law 475 on the 
Pharmaceutical 
Service 
Pharmacists are public officials who own the pharmacy.  Can sell once 
during life time and spouse/children can inherit.  Applies to existing 
pharmacies as well. Half of all new pharmacies must be assigned to private 
pharmacists through public competition regulated by state and universities.  
Remainder assigned to municipalities. 
Professional 
Market 
State 
 
Law reinforces both market logic (private ownership, 
inheritable property, can sell once) and state logic 
(municipalities can open pharmacies) 
1991 
Law 362 on the 
Pharmaceutical 
Service 
Allows for limited companies constituted by pharmacists to own up to four 
pharmacies, provided that all pharmacists are members of Provincial Order 
(local register) where the pharmacies are located. 
Professional 
Market 
State 
Corporate 
Law adds a weak version of corporate logic to 
existing arrangement.  
2006 
Law Decree 223 
(Bersani) 
Creates new organizational form of “parafarmacia”, a shop restricted to sale 
of OTC drugs, and allows opening of “corners” in supermarkets and shops, 
provided that a pharmacist is present.  
Professional 
Market 
State 
Corporate 
Law strengthens market logic and weakens state in 
existing arrangement by allowing specialized outlets 
for OTC medication. 
2009 
Law Decree 153 Increases number of public health services (e.g. pharmaceutical care) to be 
performed through pharmacies. Restricts the use of traditional green cross 
symbol to pharmacies (“parafarmacie” cannot use it) 
Professional 
Market  
State 
Corporate 
Law strengthens professional logic by recognizing 
the role of pharmacists, and strengthens state logic, 
by determining professional services to be performed 
by pharmacies as strongholds of the NHS 
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Table 4: Critical Events Related to Pharmacy Ownership in Sweden  
 
 
Year Critical Event Brief Description Logics Interpretation 
1683 
 
First collective 
charter 
King authorized first regulation specific to pharmacists.  Pharmacists had 
exclusive right to sell drugs in specific area.  State limited number of 
charters. Charters can be sold to other pharmacists. .  
Professional 
Market 
State 
Arrangement joins state, market and 
professional logics together.     
1873 
 
Restriction of  sale 
of charters 
Access to charters regulated through qualifications.  Pharmacists had to 
have pharmacy degree and work for four years before applying for charter 
from state. Pharmacy charters can no longer be sold.           
Professional 
Market 
State 
 
Strengthens state influence in arrangement.  
Weakened market.  
1930s 
Profit regulation State regulated profitability of pharmacies, although they continued to be 
privately owned.  
Professional 
Market 
State 
Strengthened state and weakened 
professional and market influence. 
1971 
Nationalization Creation of state owned monopoly, Apoteket AB. Pharmacists are 
government employees. Location controlled by government. Sale of drugs 
restricted to pharmacies.  
Professional 
State 
Corporate 
Strengthened state influence and added 
corporate (Apoteket AB is incorporated) 
Eliminated market from arrangement.  
2009 
New Pharmacy Act Private-owned pharmacies permitted, both individual and chain. Owners 
do not have to be pharmacists but pharmacist must be on duty. OTC drugs 
can be sold at other retail outlets. Supervision by government agency. 
Professional 
State 
Market 
Corporate 
Law adds market logic to arrangement and 
weakens state influence.  
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Table 5: Critical Events Related to Pharmacy Ownership in the USA 
 
                    
Year Critical Event Brief Description Logics Interpretation 
1927 
Pennsylvania State 
Pharmacy 
Ownership Law  
State law aimed at expansion of chain drug stores.  It restricted ownership 
of pharmacies to pharmacists.  Required that all drug stores thereafter 
opened be owned either by registered pharmacists or a corporation in 
which all members are pharmacists. 
Professional 
Market  
State 
Asserts primacy of professional over 
market logic in service of public health.  
1928 
Liggett v. Baldridge  U.S. Supreme Court case which ruled on the constitutionality of the 1927 
Pennsylvania State Law restricting ownership.   Decision was that law was 
“unreasonable and unnecessary restriction upon private business.”   
Professional 
Market  
Eliminates the primacy of professional 
over market logic. Asserts primacy of 
market.  
1963 
North Dakota State 
law 
North Dakota approves law that limits ownership and operation of 
pharmacies to licensed pharmacists or to corporations in which at least two 
pharmacists are directors. 
Professional 
Market  
Attempt to re-establish the primacy of 
professional with market logic 
1973 
North Dakota State 
Board of Pharmacy 
v. Snyder’s Drug 
Stores, Inc. 
U.S. Supreme Court case which ruled on constitutionality of 1963 North 
Dakota Law stipulating that only pharmacies that are majority owned by a 
licensed pharmacists (or group of pharmacists) may be granted a permit to 
operate in state.  Decision was to overturn 1928 Liggett v. Baldridge ruling 
.  
Professional 
Market  
State 
 
States allowed to determine balance 
between market and professional logics.   
Sanctions join market and professional 
logics.   
2009 
North Dakota State 
law upheld 
Walgreens (large USA pharmacy chain) guides of chain retailers’ lobbying 
effort to repeal the pharmacy ownership law.  Effort fails and existing law 
upheld.  North Dakota is the only State in the USA without large 
pharmaceutical chains 
Professional 
Market  
 
Confirms existing arrangement against 
challenge and attempts to give market 
logic prominence over professional one 
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Figure 1: Critical events in deciding the ownership of pharmacies in the four countries 
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Figure 2: Polity models and their historical shift underpinning the pharmacy field level dynamics (1800-2010). 
Modified from Jepperson, 2000. 
 
 
 
 
 
44 
 
 
 
Figure 3: Field-level institutional complexity (1800-2010) 
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